A second situation in which ones bodily integrity is violated is where — Bodily integrity

"Some readers might now be thinking that their skepticism about the existence of a right to privacy has been more than vindicated – and by an opponent! - but this is to forget the lesson of the first section, and so to fall victim to the second misconception I promised to dispel. Privacy, to repeat, is essential for an autonomous life. It is therefore self-defeating for anybody who embraces the liberal ideal of personal autonomy to deny that there is a right to privacy in order to defend a competing right to bodily integrity. For why is bodily integrity valuable? In large part precisely because it is another prerequisite for living autonomously. The implication of finding a common root both for rights and rights to bodily integrity in a liberal conception of well-being, it should be evident, is that bodily integrity would be worth much less (though certainly not worthless)46 if privacy interests lacked adequate protection. (The reverse relation also holds, of course: a surfeit of privacy would be inadequate compensation for a substantial loss of bodily autonomy). It is certainly much to be regretted that rights always over-extend to situations in which the protection they afford is unwarranted or abused, as well as to situations in which the right-holders interest in privacy is trivial or non-existent. But this over-extension is an attribute that the right to privacy shares with every other species of right; and while it is possible to reduce the area of over-extension through careful drafting and interpretation, at some point further refinements can only be bought at the cost of excluding meritorious cases from the ambit of the right. No amount of handwringing or denial will alter that conceptual reality, or falsify the moral truth about rights. Unless one is prepared to reject the liberal ideal of autonomy itself, therefore, the right to privacy seems secure, its faults and limitations notwithstanding."

"I am thus particularly concerned with the ways in which markers of political identity have joined together with markers of reproductive or biological identity to produce biopolitical, rather than liberal or authoritarian space. I am interested, in other words, in the ways in which a citizens political status as a consenting individual collides with a citizens biological status as a being possessed of bodily integrity. Indeed, I would argue that consent and bodily integrity have come together as “the” twin pillars of appropriate sexual, reproductive, and political structures only as law has become a function of biopolitics. I would argue, moreover, that since this moment, the consent/bodily integrity formula has been critical to the obsolescence of the juridically defined citizen. The invocation of this formula has been the most obvious in recent national and international interpretations of rape. Rape, in fact, has been articulated as a “crime against humanity” precisely as the “conception of the material integrity of the body as a right” has developed, and as the crime has come to be understood first and foremost “as a violation of autonomy.”"

"Children, however, are noy the only partial citizens or non-citizens regulated by national or international political structures, and it is here that the consent/bodily integrity formula becomes problematic. Another increasingly recognizable non-citizen or partial citizen is the (internal or external) refugee-mature, sane regulated, but not in any way a full political actor. Indeed, what recent national and international interpretations of consent and bodily integrity have produced from the perspective of refugees-even, or especially, to the extent that they have been endowed with ersatz rights-is a situation in which any and all sexual or reproductive behavior on their part has become criminal. Sex has become rape and reproduction has become criminal abortion and/or criminal procreation."

"A second aspect of the consent/bodily integrity formula that I would like to consider in brief now and explore in more detail later on is the process by which consent has become the instrument used to exercise any meaningful right to bodily integrity-and has thus become a means, again, or criminalizing all sex. The simultaneous invocation of bodily integrity and consent in contemporary legislation has, I will argue, defined non0criminal sex as an activity in which a citizen consents specifically to a violation of his or her bodily integrity. By consenting to this violation, however, this same citizen effectively transfers sovereign power-transfers the sovereigns unique ability to waive a citizens rights-to his or her sexual or reproductive partner. The only choice on the part of individuals engaging in sexual activity has therefore become a criminal one: 1) an individual can violate another individuals right to bodily integrity without his or her consent and thereby commit the traditional liberal crime that is rape, or 2) an individual can violate another individuals right to bodily integrity with his or her consent, usurp the sovereign prerogative, and thus commit a biopolitical act of treason."

"The most basic issue raised in both Cardozos ruling and Scarrys analysis is, then, the issue of space. Bodily boundaries are conflated with civic boundaries. The violation of bodily integrity is not about violence; it is about trespass and the public and private spheres-it is about the duty of a free government to preserve these spheres whole and intact. As Scarry suggests, therefore, if we accept this approach to bodily integrity, and in particular the right to bodily integrity, the physical and legal borders of the body and the physical and legal borders of the nation state become in many ways one and the same thing. But Scarry is certainly not the only theorist to point out this relationship between rights rhetoric and bodily integrity or between bodily borders and the articulation of political space. As Alan Hyde has noted in his Bodies of Law, for instance, “the private body is a right, conceptualized as space, weighted against other interests and therefore not absolute; it is, therefore, public and social … [R]ights are often visualized with spatial metaphors; in Roe v. Wade, typically they are “areas or zones.” [italics in original]"

"[A]ll the while Florence was making its way through the courts, law enforcement officials were playing fast and loose with the Fourth Amendments prohibition on searches and seizures, especially as it relates to violations of bodily integrity and roadside strip searches. Examples of minor infractions which have resulted in strip searches include: individuals arrested for driving with a noisy muffler, driving with an inoperable headlight, failing to use a turn signal, riding a bicycle without an audible bell, making an improper left turn, engaging in an antiwar demonstration (the individual searched was a nun, a Sister of Divine Providence for 50 years). Police have also carried out strip searches for passing a bad check, dog leash violations, filing a false police report, failing to produce a drivers license after making an illegal left turn, having outstanding parking tickets, and public intoxication. A failure to pay child support could also result in a strip search."