"When we ask whether an agents beliefs are justified we are asking whether he has done all he should to bring it about that he have true beliefs. The notion of justification is thus essentially tied to that of action, and equally to the notion of responsibility. Questions of justification are thus questions about the ethics of belief. In thinking about epistemology in ethical terms, however, it is important to remember that beliefs are not freely chosen; coming to believe something is not a voluntary action. The ethics of belief will thus not issue in rules of acceptance, but rather in rules of conduct. Truth-seeking agents ought to comport themselves in a certain manner."
Intellectual responsibility is the quality of being adequately reflective about the truth of one's beliefs. People are intellectually responsible if they have tried hard enough to be reflective about the truth of their beliefs, aiming not to miss any information that would cause them to abandon those beliefs as false.
"Responsible knowers are uneasy about possible inconsistency and incoherence within their own system of knowledge and within "public" systems of knowledge that they are tempted to endorse or inclined to reject. Many of the examples cited at the outset require would-be knowers not to turn aside from, or attempt to explain away, aspects of experience that do not fit with what they can reasonably claim to know."
"If upon thought hang all deliberate activities and the uses we make of all our other powers, Lockes assertion that it is of the highest concernment that care should be taken of its conduct is a moderate statement."
"Primarily, naturally, it is not we who think, in any actively responsible sense; thinking is rather something that happens in us. Only so far as one has acquired control of the method in which the function of suggestion occurs and has accepted responsibility for its consequences, can one truthfully say, "I think so and so."
"By "intellectual responsibility," I did not mean any specific responsibility of intellectuals as such, but first and foremost, the intellectual responsibility of all human beings. The question, therefore, was not about the role of intellectuals in society, but about the attitude towards culture, the relation of individuals to collective heritage, whether in Africa or, for that matter, in any part of the world. The question, in other words, was this: Why, in what sense, to what extent cant we help identifying with the values and thoughts developed by our foreparents? What are the effects of such identification? How far does it contribute to personal and collective creativity and freedom? When does it, conversely, start being counter-productive? No one should hide behind his/her people or traditions, or rely on them to think on his/her behalf. No one should deny his/her paternity or parenthood over ideas h/she expresses and positively asserts. No one should stubbornly stick to such ideas once clearly refuted. I believe there is a minimum, universal ethics of thought, without which no communication would ever be possible among humans. But I also believe this ethics is constantly challenged, in all cultures, by different forms and kinds of sophistry. In this respect, no culture holds any kind of monopoly over either universalism or relativism. These are, instead, two poles of a tension inherent to all cultures. Philosophy is the name given, in Western languages, to the systematic development of the first pole and the borderline discourses thereby generated."
"Theology has borrowed, and coloured for her own use, the principles which were first brought into vogue in politics. If in the one field it is the fashion to consider convenience first and truth second, in the other there is a corresponding fashion of placing truth second and emotional comfort first."
"This Humanist whom no beliefs constrained Grew so broad-minded he was scatter-brained."