Edwin Curley

"Why, in his discussion of God’s indivisibility, does Spinoza focus on finite things, such as individual quantities of water? This emphasis would be out of place if Curley were right. For if he were right, God’s being extended is no threat at all to God’s indivisibility. Even if, per impossibile, individual bodies were capable of existence independently of God and of each other, this would not show that, for Curley, God, the extended substance, is divisible. This is so because, for Curley, God as extended is simply the attribute of extension, and the divisibility of the modes of extension which are, for Curley, somewhat ontologically removed from God would have no bearing on God’s indivisibility. But in 1p15s, Spinoza obviously does see individual bodies as having a bearing on God’s indivisibility, and this goes against Curley’s interpretation."

"Here we can see that in an important way Curley is right after all. He denies that Spinoza’s in-relation (the relation of being in itself or in another) is an inherence relation. In doing so, Curley affirms that the in-relation just is the relation of causation. While I disagree with Curley about inherence, he is, I believe, absolutely right that the in-relation just is causation or, more generally, conception."

"I am here to argue against the existence of the Christian God. I am not here to defend atheism, contrary to the impression Dr. Craigs talk might have given you. Look, I think there are many ways of thinking about God. And I think some of them are ways I might accept. I just cant accept the Christian God."

"I would like to point out that there is a deeper point here that transcends anything Spinoza might say about extension or thought in particular. This deeper point is a reflection of Spinoza’s naturalism and shows that, in the end, Curley is importantly right in one respect. Return to Curley’s interpretation. For him, modes are merely causally dependent on God, they do not inhere in God, they are not states of God. And, while Spinoza does say that modes are in God, by this, for Curley, Spinoza means only that they are caused by God. So, for Curley, there are two different kinds of dependence: inherence and what might be called mere causation or dependence that is not inherence. These are both kinds of conceptual dependence. The states of a thing would be conceived through the thing on which they depend, and Curley-esque modes as mere effects would be conceived through substance."