Günther Blumentritt

"Every soldier outside Moscow knew that this was a battle for life or death. ... In 1941 the choice for the Germans was only to hold fast or to be annihilated."

"Then the weather suddenly broke and almost overnight the full fury of the Russian winter was upon us. The thermometer suddenly dropped to thirty degrees of frost. This was accompanied by heavy falls of snow. Within a few days the countryside presented the traditional picture of a Russian winter."

"When Moscow was... almost in sight, the mood both of commanders and troops changed. With amazement and disappointment we discovered in late October and early November that the beaten Russians seemed quite unaware that as a military force they had almost ceased to exist. During these weeks enemy resistance stiffened. ... Marshal Zhukov had now assumed command. ... For weeks his men had been constructing a defensive position in depth. ... Skilfully camouflaged strong points, wire entanglements and thick minefields now filled the forests which covered the western approaches to Moscow."

"Hitler... gave us his opinion that the war would be finished in six weeks. After that he wanted to conclude a reasonable peace with France, and then the way would be free for an agreement with Britain."

"He [Hitler] then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. ... He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany’s position on the Continent. ... He concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that she would regard as compatible with her honour to accept."

"The battle of Moscow was the first major German defeat on land during the Second World War. It marked the end of the Blitzkrieg technique which had won Hitler and his Wehrmacht such spectacular victories. ... It was in Russia that the first fatal decisions were taken. From the political point of view, perhaps the most fatal of all had been the decision to attack that country in the first place. ... Many of our leaders had grossly underestimated the new enemy. This was partly due to ignorance. ... Several of our responsible senior officers had never campaigned in the East, having spent the whole of the First World War on the Western Front, and had no idea of the difficulties presented by the terrain nor of the toughness of the Russian fighting man. They chose to ignore the warnings of the experts."